Divided or coordinated power? Considerations on the division of power in the Russian Federation (J. Zalesny, журнал "Kutafin University Law Review", N 2 (Volume 4), October 2017)

Divided or coordinated power? Considerations on the division of power in the Russian Federation

J. Zalesny,

Habilitated doctor, Associate Professor,

Institute of Political Science, University of Warsaw (Poland)

Журнал "Kutafin University Law Review", N 2 (Volume 4), October 2017, р. 527-543.

The present analysis is devoted to the way in which the principle of power division is applied in the Russian Federation. A thesis is posed that in the governing system adopted in Russia it has its application; however, it is not treated as a priority. It is subordinated to the principle of harmonious cooperation of the bodies of state power. A special role in this aspect was assigned by the constitution to the President. Without being included within the division of power, he is supposed to be the coordinator of the harmonious functioning and cooperation of the organs of state power.

Table of contents

I. Introduction

II. The division of power

III. Power division and the unity of power

IV. Tripartition of power

V. The President of the Russian Federation in the system of divided power

VI. The President of the Russian Federation as the coordinator of harmonious functioning and cooperation of the bodies of the state power

VII. The President of the Russian Federation and the vertical division of power

VIII. Conclusions

References

I. Introduction

The history of power division in Russia is quite short. The principle of the division of power was referred to in the Declaration of state sovereignty of the Russian Federation from 12 June 1990. According to it, the division of legislative, executive and judicial powers was the key principle of the functioning of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic as a state of law, although it should be remembered at the same time that it had already been mentioned during the political reform in 1906. Nevertheless, neither then nor in the successive decades did it play any greater role.

In 1992 the principle of the division of power obtained constitutional confirmation in the new edition of the constitution. Art. 3 established that the system of state power in the Russian Federation is based on the principle of the division of legislative, executive and judicial powers. The principle of the division of power as a principle of the state's political system, both on the federal level and on the level of the Federation's subjects, was expressed in the Constitution from 12 December 1993. The implementation of the Constitution (adopted in a referendum from 12 December 1993) on 25 December 1993 closed the process of constitutionalization of the principle of the division of power. At the same time, it determined the constitutional frameworks of contemporary Russia.

The variety of solutions referring to the issue of power division in the course of constitutional work after the collapse of the USSR was reflected in the multitude of projects of the constitution. At the same time, the principle of power division was expressed in a majority of them. The fact that it is referred to by the authors of different projects of the constitution allows believing that the principle of the division of power was treated as a necessary and obvious basis of the newly built political system of the country.

II. The division of power

The principle of the division of power - as one of the rules of the constitutional system of Russia - was expressed by the legislator in art. 10 of the Constitution. It is articulated in the horizontal aspect. The law maker established that the state power is wielded according to the rule of the division into legislative, executive and judicial powers. The creator of the political regime, on the other hand, did not give an exhaustive answer to the question on the character of mutual relations and influences taking place between the organs of state power.

The horizontal division of power in Russia, as a federal state, is supplemented with the vertical division. It coexists with the separation of power between the Federation and its components, which are the subjects of the Russian Federation. It takes place according to the rule of cooperation of the federal authorities and the entities of the Federation, considering the competences commonly performed by the organs of the federal authorities and the subjects of the Federation. Realization of the division of power on two levels, i.e. the federal one and the level of the Federation's subjects, complicates the relations of the authorities between all the bodies of the competent branches of the authorities. This should be complemented with the local government, via which the nation's power is also realized and which is also divided into representative and executive powers.

Both these issues, i.e. the horizontal and the vertical divisions of power, should be viewed taking into account the fact that the source of all the state power, independently of how it was divided and what relations regarding the competences take place between the organs of state power and the federal authorities, is the nation (art. 3 of the Constitution). It is the nation which gives the capability to act both to the bodies of the federal authorities and the bodies of power of the Federation's subjects.

III. Power division and the unity of power

While establishing the horizontal and the vertical divisions of power, the Russian law maker started with the principle of the unity of power. The doctrine of the Russian constitutional law emphasizes the distinction between the principle of power division and the unity of state power*(1). It is clearly stated that the principle of power division does not violate the unity of state power understood as the unity of strategic goals and the vectors of the activity of all bodies of state power. In the same actual conditions, different bodies of state power cannot give the same addressees mutually exclusive orders or prohibitions of behavior. They must act with the aim of carrying out the same political values shared by big social groups and satisfying the state's strategic interests*(2).

In the Russian science of law, the unity of state power means the unity of the whole will of the bodies of state authorities. It should be understood not as the unity of the bodies of state power or a separation of functions and competences but as the unity in expressing the will by the sovereign comprised in the unity of the established and realized law. The unity of state power is above all justified by the situation that - according to art. 3 of the Constitution - the only source of power in the Russian Federation is its multinational people*(3). There are no and there cannot be any three powers. The power is one and it belongs to the people*(4). That is why the power cannot be divided as then the nation would cease to be the sovereign. The task of the state, on the other hand, is to make a border between the competences of different bodies of power, with the assumption of the unity of state power. In the context of the understanding of the principle of the unity of power, a lack of any constitutional reference of the President to the division of power is characteristic. The President secures the unity of state power understood as the compatibility of the activity of the authorities with the sovereign will of the nation. In this way, the Soviet concepts of the unity of power got correlated in the Russian doctrine of constitutional law with the democratic concepts of the division of power, which should be treated as the Russian contribution to the concept of power division.

IV. Tripartition of power

In Russia, the very division of power into legislative, executive and judicial ones is viewed as the basis to realize it. State power is not divided between the bodies of state power. In accordance with art. 10 of the Constitution, its realization is divided. This article says that the state power in the Russian Federation is exercised on the basis of its division into legislative, executive and judicial powers, and not that it is divided in itself. Emphasis was laid on the functional aspect, the dynamics of power and the process of realizing it. The uniform state power is divided in the process of its realization. The fact that realization of state power on the basis of the division of power and not the division of power is spoken about should be exposed. In this way emphasis is placed on the unity of state power realized by different, mutually distinguished bodies of power. The bodies of legislative, executive and judicial powers enjoy organizational and functional independence to a definite extent.

While proclaiming the principle of the division of power, the Russian creator of the political system does not proclaim its balance, which in itself does not have to mean that it is not realized in the political practice. The principle of the division of state power brings about consequences for the organization of the state power. It takes place within the frameworks of the competences of the bodies of the state power spoken about in the regulations of the Constitution as well as in constitutional procedures determining the relations taking place between those powers. It is only when they are viewed in connection with all the specifically expressed constitutional norms establishing the system of the bodies of the state power and characterizing the relations between them that they show the content of the principle of the division of state power. The fact is also of importance that the creator of the political regime deals with the principle of the division of power in the first chapter of the Constitution ("The fundamentals of the constitutional system"). In accordance with art. 16 item 2 of the Constitution, no provisions outside the first chapter of the Constitution may contradict the fundamental principles of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation. Thus, the principle of the division of power is stabilized. It consists in stricter legal protection than the regulations of the Constitution devoted to particular bodies of state power (chapters four to seven of the Constitution). This means that the regulations concerning the bodies of state power must be interpreted and applied through the light of observing the principle of the division of power.

The constitutional principle of the division of power serves to determine the competences of the bodies of state power in the constitutional regulations of federal laws and to specify the competences of those bodies within the frameworks of interpretation of the regulations of the Constitution performed by the Constitutional Court on the basis of art. 125 item 4 of the Constitution. This is the basis to settle the appearing constitutional and other legal collisions in the forms provided by the regulations of the Constitution, the federal constitutional laws and federal laws.

Distinguishing the bodies of power equipped with competences is accompanied - according to art. 10 of the Constitution - by their independence. "Independence" of the legislative, the executive and the judiciary should be seen through the light of all the constitutional regulations. Understanding it as "autonomy" or "separation" of powers should not be adopted. Separation of the bodies of power, or their confrontation, does not serve the state's interests or their realization.

The bodies of state power are dependent on each other in a permanent way. Their cooperation is required. It is only through the latter that the unity of the state power, desired by the Constitution, is possible to achieve.

V. The president of the Russian Federation in the system of divided power

The legal and political roles assigned to the President should be seen in the aspect of "cooperation" of powers and securing the unity of the state power. A peculiarity of the Russian variant of the division of power is the special legal status given by the creator of the political system to the President. The key issue in the President's picture is his place in the system of state power and the form of his relations with its bodies. The analysis of the President's place and role in the system of the division of power constitutes one of the most important, and thus complex, constitutional research problems. It arouses numerous doubts and controversies related to classification, the consequence of which is that the Russian system of government itself is classified in a variety of ways. It is seen as similar to the semi-presidential system of government, the presidential-parliamentary system, the presidential system, or still other definitions are sought. This is connected with the fact that the constitution does not clearly define the institution of the President itself as well as with the specific character of the President's competences.

The President of the Russian Federation acquired the status which is not included within tripartition of power proclaimed in art. 10 of the Constitution. He is considered to be the head of state, without being a body of the executive, the legislative or the judicial powers. In this context of the analysis we can say that the legal and political position of the President does not clearly fit the classical triad of divided power, or that it disturbs it*(5). This alone does not mean that he President was placed above the bodies of state power and that he performs the role of the highest body of state power. In the light of the constitutional regulation, each of the organs of the state power realizes its constitutionally assigned competences independently and on its own responsibility. The very fact that the President was not included within the three powers is nothing extraordinary. It is not possible to fit him within the scheme of tripartition of power. The fact that the President is placed beyond the executive power allows to state that the head of state is not a body of the executive.

The status of the President as the head of state is the form of power but different from those included within the Montesquieu triad. The creator of the political regime himself induces this direction of reflections. Art. 11 of the Constitution clearly provides, among other things, that state power in the Russian Federation is exercised by the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly (the Council of the Federation and the State Duma), the Government of the Russian Federation, and the courts of the Russian Federation. A comparative analysis of art. 10 and 11 allows saying that the three segments of power (legislative, executive and judicial) correspond to the four groups of subjects wielding the state power. At the same time, although the President has not been assigned to the executive power (nor the legislative or the judicial ones), he acts on the basis and within the frameworks of the regulations of the Constitution and the laws. It is in those that the President's competences are regulated.

VI. The President of the Russian Federation as the coordinator of harmonious functioning and cooperation of the bodies of the state power

What is important for the understanding of the Russian variant of tripartition of power is that although the President is not classified within the tripartition of power, he is supposed to secure harmonious functioning and cooperation of the bodies of the state power. He is not supposed to be the neutral power*(6), but he is to perform the role of an arbiter (though - as different from France - he is not called an "arbiter" in the regulations of the Constitution) in the relations taking place between the bodies of public power, both in the horizontal and vertical aspects. As an arbiter, the President settles disputes, i.e. he imposes his opinion on the participants of conflicts. The function referred to here is one of the most important in determining and understanding the constitutional importance of the President and his relation to other bodies of public power. He constitutes the foundation for his concrete competences towards the bodies of the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers. The President realizes his coordinating function both in the horizontal aspect, i.e. in mutual relations of the bodies of the state power, and in the vertical aspect, i.e. within the frameworks of the relations occurring between the bodies of the federal power and the bodies of the subjects of the Russian Federation.

His annual addresses on the state of the country should be viewed in the context of the coordinating function of the head of state. They reflect the task of uniting the work of all bodies of the state power within the frameworks of one strategic course established by the President. This refers to both, the bodies of the federal power and the subjects of the Federation.

The presidential arbitration is used in a special way to react to the tensions existing between the federal executive and legislative powers. It serves to settle their political standpoints and to solve clashes and conflicts occurring between them. The President is even competent to undertake activities to secure the compatibility of the personal composition of the Government with the political forces in the State Duma by effecting changes in the Government or dissolving the State Duma and appointing new parliamentary elections. In the light of the problematic experiences of the 1990's the political coherence of the Government and the State Duma is necessary for their cooperation and the normal functioning of the state mechanism. There is no doubt that dismissing the cabinet or dissolving the State Duma are radical ways of solving the conflict between them and preparing the proper conditions for the future concordant cooperation of the executive with the legislative and are as such rarely used in the Russian practice.

The second basic sign of the President's arbitration in the relations taking place between the Government and the State Duma is the legislative veto. It enables to break the contradictions between the policies of the State Duma and the Government, taking into consideration the fact that in matters of key importance it is the President who appoints tasks to the cabinet, who - through the legislative veto - solves his disputes with the chambers of the Federal Assembly, which in itself shows that the leading feature of the presidential arbitration does not have to be impartiality of an arbiter. Arbitration of the head of state should also be understood as the power of arbitrary, authoritarian solutions of conflicts.

Realization of the President's function of harmonious functioning and cooperation of the bodies of the state power - much more significant than political arbitration*(7) - does not in itself mean that he is a kind of a conductor having the power to conduct his own orchestra in the form of the system of bodies of the state power*(8). For this to happen, he has to be equipped with concrete, different batons with which he can indicate the tempo, rhythm and meter of the activity of particular bodies of power. In this way the theory of law characterizes the meaning of legal rules and the system of legal norms specifying the former. In other words, legal rules are realized by means of specific competences assigned to the President. Otherwise, we could speak of ineligible involvement of the head of state in the matters which are not within his competences.

Argumentation that constitutional regulations generally determining the political status of the President should be understood through the light of the President's competences realizing the former is not the only argumentation present in the Russian doctrine of constitutional law. A contrary argumentation can be seen which is articulated, for example, by the Constitutional Court. It attributes broad legal meaning to the provisions contained in the Constitution which determine the President's functions. The Constitutional Court recognizes all constitutional provisions concerning the President's status - the content of the President's oath or his functions - as having legal importance and containing the capacity to undertake definite measures. The general provisions of the President's status can include the peremptory rights which are not named to a certain moment and they exist only potentially as if there were no specific competences. For this reason, "implied" or "concealed" competences are spoken about. They are used at their own discretion by the organ of the state power which by itself specifies the generally assigned task, placing its competences ("implied", "concealed") within its frameworks*(9). Within the constitutional norms of general character, the President has discretionary competences aimed to achieve the goals ad tasks established in them. He can act freely, at his own discretion, specifying the constitutional functions and establishing his concrete competences on their basis.

As indicated by the Constitutional Court in its verdict from 30 April 1996*(10), it can be derived from the constitutional provision (art. 80 item 2), according to which the President is the guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, that the President issues decrees regulating the issues requiring statutory settlement (not contradicting the binding laws) although this competence, as a separated competence, is not provided by the constitution. The decrees issued by him can fill the gaps in the legal shaping of the issues requiring statutory regulation. They can be binding until the proper law comes into life. According to the Constitutional Court, issuing sui generis legislative decrees does not mean a collision with the provisions of the Constitutions since they are undertaken by the guarantor of the Constitution who ensures the concordant functioning and cooperation of the bodies of the state power. The legislative activity of the President should be viewed as aimed at achieving those goals that were established in art. 80 item 2 of the Constitution and as such concordant with the Constitution. While allowing the President to issue legislative decrees limited in time, the Constitutional Court made a reservation at the same time that they cannot replace a deferral law when the regulations of the Constitution directly provided that a given problem will be regulated in a law, thus excluding the legislation of another kind. In such a situation this type of a decree would contradict the Constitution. Therefore, the constitutional reference of a given problem to the legal regulation by way of a law is the key and at the same time formalized (and susceptible to the interpretation extending the normative competences of the President) law-making limitation of the President's competences.

The construction of "implied" competences approved of by the Constitutional Court is of significant importance for the functioning of the division of power in Russian conditions. It means the possibility of extensive, and at the same time flexible, authoritarian influence on other participants of political relations. The President can do so because of such generally established directions of his activity as guaranteeing the Constitution, the sovereignty of Russian, its independence and integrity or securing the harmonious functioning and cooperation of the bodies of the state power.

The law-maker makes the President an independent body of the state power beyond the tripartition of power who has a dominating political position*(11). The presence of independent and dominating presidential power in the system of the organization and functioning of the Russia state power does not only extend the problem of the division of power beyond the traditional triad but it attributes special character to the division of power itself. The President was equipped with extended competences referring to both the legislative and the executive powers. He takes part in all spheres of their activity.

Art. 80 of the Constitution made the President the head of state. This definition indicates that within the system of power division implemented in Russia it is the President who is supposed to secure the unity of the state power and personalize the Russian statehood. In this way, the President is not, nolens volens, only beside but also above the division of power. Thanks to this he can realize his arbitration function. Guarding the unity of the state power, the president is a guarantor of harmonious functioning and cooperation of the bodies of the state power, which in turn has the consequence that on the level of law the President is not the head of the executive and is in no way an element of its system. As the head of state, the President has a number of tasks and competences. As was expressis verbis stated by the creator of the political system in art. 80 item 4 of the Constitution, as the head of the state the President of the Russian Federation represents the Russian Federation within the country and in international relations.

VII. The President of the Russian Federation and the vertical division of power

The President occupies the central place not only in the realization of the horizontal but also the vertical divisions of power. In accordance with art. 85 of the Constitution, he may use conciliatory procedures to solve disputes between the bodies of state authority of the Russian Federation and bodies of state authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation, as well as between bodies of state authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation. What is not without significance for practice, the notion of "conciliatory procedure" is specified neither within the Constitution nor by virtue of a law. The law-maker does not define the measures of conciliatory procedure which are accessible to the President and - as a result - does not define the manner or the effect of using them. The fact that the notion "conciliatory procedure" is not established is of foremost importance since it does not bind the President's activity with any, precisely articulated legal regulations. This guarantees the President's freedom in choosing, from a wide variety of conciliatory procedures, the procedure which he regards the most effective in achieving agreement and undertaking a compromise. In case the agreement is not achieved, the President has the right to submit the dispute for the consideration of a corresponding court.

Through decrees, the President has the power to interfere not only into the mutual relations occurring between the bodies of the subjects of the Federation and the bodies of federal authorities. He can also use them to regulate the organization and competences of the bodies of the executive power of the subjects of the Federation. This follows from the fact that federal bodies of the executive and the bodies of the executive of the subjects of the Federation create a uniform system of the executive power in the Russian Federation and securing its completeness and effectiveness belongs to the competences of the head of state. In this way the right to guarantee concordant functioning and cooperation of the bodies of federal authorities and the subjects of the Federation is manifested within the executive power. With the aim of establishing and maintaining a uniform and coherent system of the executive power, the President has the power to take decisions concerning the status and mutual relations between its links, i.e. the bodies of the federal executive and the bodies of the subjects of the Federation.

In accordance with art. 85 item 2 of the Constitution, the President has the right to suspend acts of the bodies of the executive power of the subjects of the Russian Federation in case these acts contradict the Constitution, the federal laws, international commitments of the Russian Federation or they violate the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. On the other hand, he cannot change or repeal them by himself. He can, however, submit a motion to the Federal Constitutional Court to have their compatibility with federal law checked. He also has the right to turn to the legislative (representative) organ of the state power of the subject of the Federation with a request to effect compatibility of the constitution of the subject of the Federation with the federal Constitution and Federal laws.

VIII. Conclusions

To sum up the analysis of the specific character of the division of power in the Russian Federation, it should be emphasized that although the applied system of state power is based on the tripartition system of power, the power of the presidential arbitration is simultaneously stressed which is appointed to secure harmonious functioning and cooperation of the bodies of state power. This arbitration exceeds each of so far known models of arbitration power*(12). The President directly influences each of the branches of federal state authorities and as for the executive, he participates in its executions within a broad scope. The Presidential function to guarantee harmonious cooperation of the bodies of state power, making him the key component of the decision system, within which he was equipped - also on the level of laws - with concrete instruments of action, assumes extended controlling rights of the President in relation to all bodies of state authorities. As such, this function is not coherent with the declared principle of the division of power. The presidential power was taken beyond the frameworks of tripartition of power and was constituted as power generically separate from them and situated above them. The Russian creator of the political system builds tripartition of power and the President as the guarantor of its efficient functioning.

In the light of the present analysis, it is observed that the Russian application of the system of the division and cooperation of powers is of unbalanced character, which results from the dominating role of the President in it. There can be seen a lack of symmetry in the relations connecting it with the legislative and the executive. The head of state dominates in the state decision process. On the Constitutional level, the President's power was taken beyond the frameworks of the classic triad of power, which is confirmed in the political practice. It is constructed as a separate power, taken above the power divided into the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers.

References

Baglaj M.W. (2007). Konstitucionnoye pravo Rossijskoy Federacii. M.: Norma (Baglaj M.W. (2007). Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation. Moscow, Norma). (In Russ.).

Czirkin V.E. (1998). Rossijskaya Konstituciya i mezdunarodnyj opyt'. Gosudarstvo i prawo. 1998. No. 12 (Czirkin, V. E. (1998). The Russian Constitution and international experience. Gosudarstvo i prawo. No. 12). (In Russ.).

Krasnov M. (2011). Zakonodatielno zakrieplennyye polnomocziya Prezidienta Rossii: neobchodimostz ili serwilizm'? Sravnitielnoye konstitucionnoye obozreniye. No. 4 (Krasnov, M. (2011). Legislative consolidation of the powers of the President of Russia: the need or servility? Sravnitielnoye konstitucionnoye obozreniye. No. 4). (In Russ.).

Medushevsky A.N. (2014). Konstitucionnaya stabilnosc i institucionalnyje izmeneniya v rossijskom politiczeskom processe. Studia Politologiczne. No. 33 (Medushevsky, A. N. (2014). Constitutional Stability and Institutional Changes in the Russian Political Process. Studia Politologiczne. No. 33). (In Russ.).

Oziganow E. (1997). Institucionalizaciya otnoszenij miezdu organami ispolnitelnoy i predstavitielnoy vlastey i politiczieskiy rezim v Rossijskoy Federacii, in Shablinskiy, I. (red.). Prezidient - Pravitelstwo - ispolnitielnaya vlast': rossijskaya model'. M.: Centr konstitucionnych issledovanyj Moskovskogo obscestviennogo nautznogo fonda (Oziganow E. (1997). The institutionalization of relations between the executive and representative authorities and the political regime in the Russian Federation, in Shablinskiy I. (ed.) President - Government - the executive power: Russian model. Moscow, Centr konstitucionnych issledovanyj Moskovskogo obscestviennogo nautznogo fonda). (In Russ.).

Okunkow L.A. (1996). Prezident Rossijskoy Federacii. Konstituciya ipoliticzeskayapraktyka. M.: Norma (Okunkow L.A. (1996). President of the Russian Federation: the Constitution and political practice. Moscow, Norma). (In Russ.).

Postnikov A.Ye. (red.) (2012). Gosudarstviennaya Duma Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossijskoy Federacii: k 20-lietiju dejatielnosti, kak predstavitelnogo i zakonodatelnogo organa Rossijskoy Federacii. M.: Gosudarstviennaya Duma Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossijskoy Federacii (Postnikov A.Ye. (ed.) (2012). State Duma of the Russian Federation: the 20th anniversary of activity as representative and legislative body of the Russian Federation. Moscow, Gosudarstviennaya Duma Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossijskoy Federacii). (In Russ.).

Soboleva A.K. (2013). Princip razdeleniya vlastej, in Medushevsky, A. N. (red.). Osnovy konstitucionnogo stroja Rossii: dvadcatz liet razvitiya. M.: Institut Prava i polityki (Soboleva A.K. (2013). The principle of separation of powers, in Medushevsky A.N. (ed.). Fundamentals of the constitutional system of Russia: twenty years of development. Moscow: Institut Prava i polityki). (In Russ.).

Szymanek J. (2009). Arbitraz polityczny glowy panstwa. Warszawa: Elipsa (Szymanek, J. (2009). Political arbitration of the head of state. Warsaw: Elipsa).

Trochev A. (2008). Judging Russia. Constitutional Court in Russian Politics 1990-2006. Cambridge University Press.

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Zujkov A. (2009). Prezident dla Rossii: ot idei do Glavy 4. Sravnitelnoye konstitucionnoye obozreniye. No. 4 (Zujkov A. (2009). President for Russia: from the idea to chapter 4. Comparative Constitutional Review. No. 4). (In Russ.).

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*(1) Cf. Okunkow L.A., Prezident Rossijskoy Federacii. Konstituciya i politiczeskaya praktyka, M.: Norma, 1996, 36 (L.A. Okunkow, President of the Russian Federation: the Constitution and political practice M.: Norm, 1996).

*(2) Czirkin V.E. Rossijskaya Konstituciya i mezdunarodnyj opyt. Gosudarstvo i prawo. 1998. N 12, 15 (V.E. Czirkin, The Russian Constitution and international experience, State and law. 1998. N 12)

*(3) Yengibaran R.V., Tadevosian E.V. Konstitucionnoye pravo, M.: Jurist, 2000, 204 (R.V. Yengibaran, E.V. Tadevosian, Constitutional law, M.: Jurist, 2000)).

*(4) Soboleva A.K., Princip razdeleniya vastej, [w:] Medushevsky A.N. (red.), Osnovy konstitucionnogo stroja Rossii: dvadcatz liet razvitiya, M.: Institut Prava i polityki, 2013, 80 (A.K. Soboleva, The principle of separation of powers, [in:] A.N. Medushevsky (ed.), Fundamentals of the constitutional system of Russia: twenty years of development, M.: Institute of Law and Public Policy, 2013).

*(5) Medushevsky A. N., Konstitucionnaya stabilnosc i institucionalnyje izmeneniya v rossijskom politiczeskom processe/ Studia Politologiczne. 2014. N. 33, 37 (A.N. Medushevsky, Constitutional Stability and Institutional Changes in the Russian Political Process, Political Science Studies. 2014. N. 33).

*(6) Oziganow E., Institucionalizaciya otnoszenij miedu organami isponitelnoy i predstavitielnoy vlastey i politiczieskiy reim v Rossijskoy Federacii, [w:] Shablinskiy I. (ed.), Prezidient - Pravitelstwo - ispolnitielnaya vlast: rossijskaya model, M.: Centr konstitucionnych issledovanyj Moskovskogo obscestviennogo nautznogo Fonda, 1997, 44 (E. Oziganow, The institutionalization of relations between the executive and representative authorities and the political regime in the Russian Federation, [in:] I. Shablinskiy (ed.) President - Government - the executive power: Russian model (M.: Center for Constitutional Studies of the Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1997)).

*(7) Krasnov M., Zakonodatielno zakrieplennyye ponomocziya Prezidienta Rossii: neobchodimostz ili serwilizm? / Sravnitielnoye konstitucionnoye obozreniye. 2011. N 4, 95 (M. Krasnov, Legislative consolidation of the powers of the President of Russia: the need or servility?, Comparative Constitutional Review. 2011. N 4).

*(8)Cf. Baglaj M.W., Konstitucionnoye pravo Rossijskoy Federacii, M.: Norma, 2007, 148 (M.W. Baglaj, Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation, M.: (Norm, 2007)).

*(9) Cf. Trochev A., Judging Russia. Constitutional Court in Russian Politics 1990-2006, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 128; Postnikov A.Ye. (red.), Gosudarstviennaya Duma Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossijskoy Federacii: k 20-lietiju dejatielnosti, kak predstavitelnogo i zakonodatelnogo organa Rossijskoy Federacii, M.: Gosudarstviennaya Duma Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossijskoy Federacii. 2012, 250-251 (A.Ye. Postnikov (ed.) State Duma of the Russian Federation: the 20th anniversary of activity as representative and legislative body of the Russian Federation, M.: (The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. 2012)).

*(10) Sobraniye zakonodatelstva RF. 1996, N 19, s. 2320 (The set of laws RF. 1996, N 19).

*(11) Zujkov A., Prezident dla Rossii: ot idei do Gavy 4 /Sravnitelnoye konstitucionnoye obozreniye. 2009. N 4, 40. (A. Zujkov, President for Russia: from the idea to chapter 4,Comparative Constitutional Review. 2009. N 4).

*(12) An overall picture of the understanding of arbitration is given by Szymanek J., Arbitraz polityczny glowy panstwa, Warszawa: Elipsa, 2009 (J. Szymanek, Political arbitration of the head of state, Warsaw: Ellipse, 2009)